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Balancing Secularism with Religious Freedom: In Lautsi v. Italy, the European 
Court of Human Rights Evolved  
 
Until recently, the principles of secularism, religious pluralism and state neutrality have 
been perceived in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as 
partially overlapping concepts. However, in Lautsi and others v. Italy, the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR has – in a landmark decision – qualified the interplay between these ideas. This 
essay will argue that Lautsi v. Italy signals a turning point in the previous ECtHR 
jurisprudence, which often associated secularism with the protection of pluralism and 
democracy.  
There are two main consequences of the decision. Firstly, the ECtHR recognised that a 
state's neutrality cannot be deductively constructed as a logical manifestation of secularism. 
In this context secularism means ‘a secular view of a lay public sphere as the only solution 
to ensuring genuine equality between members of majority and minority churches, 
agnostics, atheists or non-theists and eliminating religious and anti-religious tensions’ 
(McGoldrick 2011:454). For instance, in Sahin v. Turkey, the Grand Chamber explicitly 
embraced the narrative of the Turkish Constitutional Court that allied secularism with a 
defence of pluralism.  
Secondly, in Lautsi v. Italy, the ECtHR recognised the epistemic implications of pluralism. 
Pluralism as a legal concept demands the recognition of diversity and the acceptance of a 
dialogue that transforms a multitude of legal orders (and a plurality of perceptions of the 
good life represented by such a multitude), in procedures aimed at accommodating 
concurring individual rights. Concurring rights are granted to all (e.g. the right given to 
parents to choose the type of education for their children) but they might generate 
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competing claims over public resources.  The multiplicity of calls for recognition of 
individual rights makes it inappropriate and impractical for a state to favour one group over 
the other, leading instead to an open-ended dialogue in which institutions are, by default, 
receptive of all demands. McGoldrick calls this pluralist approach to faith based demands: 
‘positively secular’ (2011:455)  
I argue that the recognition of pluralism and the democratic practices that qualify that 
pluralism should be a point of departure for the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in areas such 
as the display of religious symbols in classrooms. This approach serves as an alternative to 
the practice of balancing rights, which greatly restricts the breadth of religious freedom and 
de jure imposes a monist conception of rational thinking.  
The essay will be divided into three sections. The first part will discuss how the 
antagonistic relationship between theism and secularism in Italy has shaped the issues of 
religious symbols in the schoolroom. I will argue that concurring views of the significance 
of symbols have historically been part of Italy's cultural heritage and that there are strong 
indications that such a democratic dialogue will continue without a definitive solution being 
reached.  
In the second section, I will explain the benefits of accepting pluralism as a criterion for 
assessing the extent of religious freedom in signatory states. A short third section will 
suggest a procedure that democratically accommodates concurrent rights.  
Introduction 
The case of Lautsi v. Italy reinvigorated a debate over the role of religious symbols in public 
schools in a way that is unprecedented in the modern history of Europe. In 2002, Mrs 
Lautsi complained about the Italian school policy of hanging crucifixes in her children’s 
school classes. She probably would not have expected that, by the time her complaint 
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against the school governors of a school in Abano Terme reached the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR, her legal team would have had to plead against Italy and another 21 signatory 
states. At the time of her initial complaint, Mrs Lautsi’s children were in a middle school 
(normally attended by children from 11 to 13 years old). The school was located in the 
small town of Abano Terme, on the outskirts of Padua and in the middle of the Venetian 
region.  
Following a secret ballot, the Council of School Governors (composed of an equal number 
of teachers and parents) refused Mrs Lautsi’s request. The council’s deliberation was, 
subsequently, challenged by Mrs Lautsi at the first-instance administrative tribunal in 
Venice (Tribunale Aministrativo del Veneto). Italy, as is the case in many other European 
states, has a system of special jurisdictions that deal respectively with civil, administrative 
and labour law litigation with different final appellate courts (Walker 2010). However, 
questions concerning constitutional compatibility may be raised to the Italian Constitutions 
Court at any stage of the judicial process. Mrs Lautsi’s counsellors did indeed question the 
constitutional admissibility of the crucifixes in her children’s school classes.  
More specifically, Lautsi’s legal team asked the Italian Constitutional Court, via the 
incidental procedure, whether the two articles of two Royal Decrees (RDs) from the 1920s 
(Art 118 RD 965 of 30th April 1924 and Art 119 of RD 1297 of 26th April 1928), that by 
default imposed the display of crucifixes in school classes, were compatible with the secular 
principles adopted by the 1948 Italian Constitution (Panara 2011, Ronchi 2011) It was 
unfortunate that such a request was dismissed by the Italian Constitutional Court because 
both decrees were considered as secondary legislation (2004). The Italian Constitutional 
Court could decide only on the constitutional compatibility of primary legislation and the 
two Royal Decrees were secondary legislation.  
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Following the refusal by the Constitutional Court to evaluate the legitimacy of the two RDs 
via the incidental procedure, Lautsi’s case reached the final appeal jurisdiction in 
administrative law matters (Consiglio di Stato). In 2006, the Consiglio di Stato also rejected 
Mrs Lautsi’s complaint but, in that instance, the court discussed the significance of the 
crucifix within the school room (2006). Ronchi provides a detailed analysis of the 
argumentation delivered by the Italian administrative courts (2011). For a statutory analysis 
of the constitutional case, see Panara (2011: 141). Having exhausted all internal remedies, 
Mrs Lautsi’s team brought her application to the ECtHR.  
In 2009, the first instance of the second section of the ECtHR court ruled in favour of 
Lautsi (Weiler 2010). One of the arguments provided by the court was that having a 
crucifix hung in a classroom could be perceived by pupils as an attempt to direct their 
learning towards a particular faith (2009: 55). However, in the review  stage in the Grand 
Chamber, the ECtHR accepted the Italian submission.  
In Lautsi, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR agreed (by a large majority) that the Italian 
state did not breach Art 2 of the First Protocol European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) by imposing a duty on schools to display a crucifix on the classroom wall. Art 2 
(in the First Protocol) safeguards the right of parents to have their children educated in 
accordance with their philosophical and religious beliefs. The court explicitly said on page 
26 of the official HCtHR typescript that Art 2 of the First Protocol has to be read in 
relation to the second comma of Art 9 ECHR (2011: 60), which gives a certain level of 
discretion to signatory states in setting the limits of freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. 
The ECtHR argued that whilst a signatory state cannot set educational policies that 
indoctrinate pupils, Italy had a ‘margin of appreciation’ in setting policies such as the one 
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that allows the hanging of religious symbols in school classes. The range of analyses that 
followed the Crucifix Case engaged the plurality of theoretical, legal and pragmatic aspects 
raised by the decision. The verdict also divided the already polarised debate. Zucca, for 
instance, who welcomed the first-instance decision (of the ECtHR that ruled in favour of 
Mrs Lautsi) was not persuaded by the reasoning provided by the Grand Chamber that 
favoured Italy (2011). 
It is outside the remit of this essay to provide a comprehensive summary of the reactions 
that followed Lautsi v. Italy. My aim is, instead, to show the enrichment brought by the 
Lautsi decision to the debate over religious pluralism. In particular, I would argue that by 
recognising a member state’s discretion in setting a policy that accommodates concurring 
rights, the ECtHR accepted the pragmatic limits of imposing secularism as the default 
neutral stance of a modern pluralistic society. Before I articulate my argument, a series of 
methodological and contextual analyses are necessary as a preliminary aid to the discussion.  
First, in this essay I will use the term ‘belief-based political claims’ to describe both theist 
and secular reasons for supporting an argument for or against the display of religious 
symbols in public institutions. Even if, in a debate over the historical development of 
human rights doctrine, a distinction can be made between assertions based on religious and 
secular narratives, in modern pluralistic societies, both groups of demands have to be 
considered as representative of a distinctive democratic political stance. In particular,  it is a 
diminution of the democratic dimension of the debate over religious symbols to assume 
that secularism is not a belief-based set of assumptions (which might not be able to be 
rationally verified). In other words, secularism is no more able than theism to establish that 
all of its assumptions are self-evident and therefore neutral (Clouser 2005, 9).   
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The logic of such an approach would automatically impose secularism as a default position 
for any political system (and for the ECtHR), instead of giving a polity the possibility of 
being able to retrieve the pragmatic accommodation of claims made by two different 
political stances. I will also use the term ‘belief-based symbols’ as inclusive of both the 
argument for the hanging of the crucifix and for the empty wall argument. Clouser 
explains, I think in very persuasive narrative  the close relation between  the epistemic 
structure of non-secular and secular beliefs (2005, 35 – 41)  
Second, the Lautsi case discusses a signatory state’s prerogative to accommodate in practice 
the concurring rights given to parents in Art 2 of the ECHR to decide on the religious 
education of their children. The debate over religious symbols in public space is inclusive 
of two typologies of debates (Mancini 2009). The first debate concerns whether the 
signatory state has the prerogative to display belief-based symbols in classrooms. A second 
typology of debates engages the dilemma as to whether a signatory state can impose a 
policy that prevents pupils, teachers and students from wearing garments that display a 
religious affiliation.  
As an example of the latter typology, in Sahin v. Turkey, a Turkish medical student wearing 
an Islamic headscarf was refused entry to one of her exams by the exam invigilators. In the 
case that followed, the ECtHR accepted the Turkish state submission that justified the ban 
of headscarves on the basis, among other arguments, of reasoned protection of public 
order (2005). In the same category as Sahin, we might include decisions over the wearing of 
the veil in French schools (1995) and cases over school uniforms in England and Wales. 
These cases are the end points of a multifaceted debate over the limits of the rights 
allocated to individuals by the ECHR (Art 9) to manifest religious beliefs by wearing a 
garment with religious significance in a public space.  
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However, the case of Lautsi fits squarely into the first group of debates (Mancini 2009). In 
Lautsi, the ECtHR was asked whether a state policy that accommodates concurring rights 
(that is, the right of parents to choose a type of education fitting their beliefs) was set in a 
way that imposes religious indoctrination. Both dilemmas (the one raised in Sahin and the 
one in Lautsi) might engage Art 9 of the ECHR and the obligation of the state to be 
neutral, but the answer relating to their accommodation can be distinguished from the 
state’s stance in terms of neutrality. The first dilemma focuses on an assessment of whether 
a right granted to individuals by the ECHR has been infringed by a state policy; the second 
concerns whether a member state’s procedure is adequate for individuals to accommodate 
their concurring stances based on the same right.  
I. Aggressive secularism in Catholic Italy: Not as odd as you might think 
Italy, along with many other European countries, is experiencing the effect of what 
McGoldrick calls aggressive secularism. There is a plethora of reasons for the expansion of 
secularisation. Some are well articulated in debates such as the one between Ratzinger and 
Habermas, which explores the philosophical genesis of the debate (2005). Other analyses 
focus, instead, on the specific issues generated by the expansion of secular visions 
generated in European societies (McGoldrick 2011).  
Perhaps one of the persusasive explanations of the increasing polarisation of views relating 
to the role of theist and secular stances occurs in Bauman’s analysis. Bauman argues, for 
instance, that one of the side effects of a globalised society is the anxiety of belonging to an 
identity group. The identity group gives shelter to the instability of a fast flowing society, 
but it demands, in exchange, a periodic re-assertion of commitment by its members. The 
display of belligerence against aliens, or even better, against a rival group, is one of the ways 
in which individuals reassert their commitment to the community (Bauman 1999). 
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However, the same level of animosity may also be found in the theist/secular debate and in 
the literature that seeks to explain it. In this section, I will argue that such a method of 
analysis is sterile and a manifestation of the antagonism it seeks to explain. In particular, I 
would like to argue that a richer understanding of Lautsi’s case can be obtained by 
considering an acknowledgement of pluralism and of the democratic limits of the 
jurisdictional accommodation of concurring belief-based claims. 
Bauman’s globalised society is a leviathan of polarised communities, which struggle for the 
recognition of their creeds and/or to retrieve resources. Parliaments and final appellate 
jurisdictions in Europe try to cope with the whirlpool of claims to the best of their abilities, 
worried that they too might be perceived as aliens and be the object of criticism by the 
loosing faction (Benhabib 1996, Breda 2007). At first sight, Mrs Lautsi’s claims also appear 
to be a manifestation of a belligerent member of a minority group of atheists seeking an 
unreasonable recognition in a deeply Catholic state. The description is misleading.  
The media and the great majority of polarised commentaries engaging the ECtHR decision 
dwelled on that set of assumptions. For instance, articles quickly referred to the fact that 
Mrs Lautsi held a Finnish passport and lived in a strongly Catholic region (Lamb 2011: 754, 
McGoldrick 2011: 464, Panara 2011: 143). The first assertion is irrelevant. The prerogative 
to challenge administrative acts by school governors is given to all parents, including those 
who might be considered immigrants without resident permits, and thus reporting in legal 
commentaries the fact that Mrs Lautsi was Finnish (with double citizenship) appears, at the 
very least, odd. Indeed, this would appear to be 'normal' procedure to discredit the claims 
of the 'out' group and reaffirm the 'in' group. For an analysis of the effect of portraying 
aliens in Italy, see Calvanese (2011).  
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The second observation – the reference to Catholic Italy – is misleading. Here, a distinction 
has to be made between articles that give blatant misdirection to their readers, and analyses 
taken from erroneous assumptions.  
Lamb, for instance, considers Italy to be the successor of the Holy Roman Empire. ‘It [the 
ECtHR] decided that the Italian Republic, home of the Vatican and heir to the Holy 
Empire, was violating the human rights of its citizens by displaying crucifixes in its state 
schools’ (at 752). The Italian Peninsula is where the Vatican (a sovereign, international 
recognised state) is located, yet that space is shared with the Republic of San Marino and 
the Italian Republic. Just as the United States of America is not the home of Canada, none 
of the three states located in the Italian Peninsula is the home of any of the others. 
Furthermore, the Holy Roman Empire, which is normally associated with the Central 
European Carolingian Empire, has never included Rome, the Vatican State or the Venetian 
region, in which the case of Lautsi originated.  
The analysis in Lamb’s article might be described either as an unwitting display of a lack of 
research or as a quixotic attempt to inflate his argument for rhetorical effect. However, 
these types of narrative, which seek to isolate Mrs Lautsi’s claim as an unreasonable 
demand can be found in most of the literature. For instance, McGoldrick uses this wording 
to describe the case: ‘Mr Lautsi is an Italian national who lives in Abano Terme, in the 
strongly Catholic region of Veneto in Northern Italy’ (at 464).  
Again, the assertion is unfounded. Venetians – I use the term Venetians to define the 
residents of Veneto – might be baptised Catholics in 86% of cases, but that is not 
translated into an acceptance of an overlapping role between the state and church (Istituto 
di studi politici economici e sociali 2010). Veneto has historically been a pluralist society 
with one of the largest communities of Jews and of Greek Orthodox Christians in Europe. 
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This point is delicate, so I need to be precise. Jews were discriminated against by the 
Venetian laws. In mediaeval Venice, Jews were confined in a heavily polluted area called 
the ‘ghetto’. The term ghetto has since become synonymous with discriminated 
communities. However, the point under discussion here is that Veneto cannot be described 
as strongly Catholic in the sense given by McGoldrick.  
Politically, in Albano Terme and in the Venetian Regions, there is a strong representation 
of leftist political parties (including the Italian Communist Party). In Abano, for instance, 
depending on the political cycle, the control of the city council alternated between left and 
conservative coalitions, which were supported by Catholic-inspired political parties such as 
the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani. However, in the past decade, the political presence of 
Catholic-inspired parties in Abano Terme and within the Venetian region has been 
consistently under 15% of the voters. Even if considering the politically active Catholics as 
all being in favour of crucifixes (that is, the entire 15%) in schoolrooms, it is a matter of 
speculation as to whether the remaining 71% would think about the issues concerned. It is 
certain that at least a quarter of all Catholics in the region voted consistently for a coalition 
that included leftist parties with strong anticlerical views (Direzione Sistema Statistico 
Regionale, 2011).  
So much for McGoldrick's perception of a strongly Catholic Venetian region. However, 
this is a trivial point. The argument here concerns the attempt to polarise the discussion, 
masking the true role of the debate as a manifestation of pluralism (Maziea 2004). More 
specifically, I argue that the attempt to mislead people on the significance of the debate (by 
somehow trivialising it) overlooked the Italian state’s serious attempt to find a pragmatic 
accommodation of the debate over belief-based symbols in classrooms.  
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It is reasonable to assume that the decision to ‘hang the crucifix’ in the classroom was not 
intended as an imposition by a religious majority. A historical analysis might act to clarify 
this point. The contentious seed that germinated in the Lautsi case was planted on the 
morning of Friday the 15 th of September 1860. The King of Piedmont, Victor Emmanuel 
II, signed RD 4336, which, in Art 140, imposed the obligation for all the Kingdom’s 
elementary schools to have a crucifix hung to one of their classroom walls. The motivation 
for RD 4336 and the edict that followed (e.g. Art 118 RD 965 of 30 April 1924) has been 
interpreted by the ECtHR, and by the rich literature that followed the controversial 
decision, as an obvious affirmation of a more general role of the entanglement between 
Catholicism and Italian institutions.  
The representations made by the legal team representing the Italian state did little to clarify 
the position of the Italian government. The arguments made in the first instance by the 
Italian legal team suggested a relationship between Italian national identity and the crucifix. 
What has been left out, was that the King who signed RD 4336 was at war with the Papal 
state and he was about to be excommunicated.  
Let me dwell on the contextual aspects of this point with a narrated reconstruction based 
on historical events taken from Montanelli’s analisys (2011) that I hope will bring some 
light to the contextual reasons that motivated the three decrees. The narrative will explain 
that in the debate over religious symbols in classrooms, Italy recognised a  democratic 
accommodation of concurring religious beliefs that has been the result of a dialogue (often 
acrimonious) between leftist anticlerical positions and Catholics. Lautsi is, with some 
margin of equivocation that is implicit in any sociological narrative, a continuation of that 
debate between the holder of concurring rights (e.g. parents and teachers), which cannot be 
expected to be curtailed by a court.  
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On the morning of the 15 th of September, the King of Piedmont was in his office. Victor 
Emanuel II (the soon-to-be King of Italy) sat in front of his desk. His closest advisor, 
Camillo Benso, the Count of Cavour (the soon-to-be, first Italian First Minister) stood next 
to the King’s desk. He thought: ‘If the Kingdom has to be saved, a series of shift  actions 
have to be taken. The most urgent of all these actions is to prevent Garibaldi’s army from 
taking Rome and the Holy Seat.’ 
The report deposited on the King’s table said that eight days before (on the 7 th of 
September), Naples had surrendered. Garibaldi’s men, an irregular militia of 25,000 men, 
had defeated the main army of the Kingdom of Naples (roughly 50,000 men). What was 
left of the Neapolitan troops was encircled and about to surrender. The intelligence memo 
came from Piedmont agents (planted in Garibaldi’s army by the Count of Cavour). The 
report continued: ‘… Garibaldi’s troops are training on newly captured rifled barrel 
cannons …. and prepare for an assault on fortified walls of (presumably) Rome’. Camillo, 
who read the report earlier, and Victor Emanuel II, knew that an attack on Rome would 
drag France – perhaps Austria – into a move in defence of the Pope. Foreign troops would 
descend on the Kingdom of Piedmont, ending its history and perhaps the life of its King. 
Early that summer, Victor Emanuel II sponsored (with weapons and logistic support) 
Garibaldi’s quixotic plan to foster a pro-Piedmont revolt in Sicily. The King did not expect 
that such a small group of individuals could put an end to his Kingdom, and possibly to his 
life. The Count of Cavour was far more cautious. He opposed the initiative wholeheartedly. 
He thought that Garibaldi was a maverick and that the plan was very risky with few 
rewards.  
The sponsoring of a civil revolt in Sicily was in violation of a secret agreement between the 
Kingdom of Piedmont and Napoleon III (the King of France). The agreement granted, in 
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exchange for the Region of Milan given to Piedmont the year before, an area of French 
political influence in the Centre and South of Italy. Sponsoring an insurrection in the south 
was a blunt breach of the agreement. Even worse was that Garibaldi could be ‘too 
successful’. His ransacked army could, for instance, conquer Sicily, try to move north to 
Naples and finally to Rome. All this could make the Kingdom of Piedmont the official 
enemy of the Catholic Church and France.  
This last forecast turned out to be correct. Garibaldi was preparing to take Rome – the last 
item on his list of objectives. The Papal army was numerically ‘a match’ for Garibaldi’s, but 
in practice, Garibaldi’s forces were veterans who were about to meet a band of 
inexperienced volunteers. Both the King and the First Minister knew that the Papal armies 
could not stop Garibaldi, and so Piedmont’s troops should be placed between Rome and 
Naples.  
By the 15th of September, the preparations for an expeditionary force were already 
underway. The Papal state divided the Italian Peninsula in two parts. If Piedmont’s armies 
wanted to stop Garibaldi and a French invasion, they would have to march across the 
Papal state. Thus, two weeks before that meeting, the King ordered two Piedmont armies 
to start marching to meet Garibaldi’s militia. Officially, sending ‘uninvited’ armies across a 
sovereign state’s borders was an act of war, yet the ambassadors to Paris  and London were 
instructed to explain that the troops’ main objective was to protect the Pope and his secular 
power over central Italy (and was not to engage in a military campaign against the Holy 
Father or the Catholic Church).  
In practice, again, a series of memos from Piedmont’s military intelligence scattered on the 
King’s desk drew a different picture. Rome was preparing to engage Piedmont’s armies in 
the field. Strengthened by a flow of volunteers from many Catholic countries, Pio IX was 
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planning to attempt to engage Piedmont’s expeditionary forces. The Pope did not need to 
defeat Piedmont; his objective was to escalate the conflict into a religious war that would 
have drawn France to his side. 
A paradoxical situation unfolded. If the Kingdom of Piedmont wanted to prevent 
Garibaldi from entering Rome (and capturing the Holy Seat), Piedmont would have to go 
to war against the Papal armies. On Friday the 15th of September, neither Victor Emmanuel 
II nor the Count of Cavour knew that, but the following Tuesday (the 18th of September 
1860), Piedmont’s army would do exactly that. Piedmont ‘disabled’ the Papal army at the 
Battle of Casterfidardo. The victory would also bring an excommunication on Victor 
Emmanuel II. By the 1870s and the end of the Italian unification, with the Savoy troops 
taking Rome, all members of the Savoy Royal Family would be excommunicated 
(Montanelli 2011).  
On that morning, Victor Emanuel II had had enough. He called one of his footmen and 
told him to prepare for his trip to Naples. He was about to leave the desk when Camillo 
Benso took a series of Parliament-stamped papers out of a folder. The two men’s eyes met 
for the first time that morning. The King, famously short tempered, was about to explode. 
The Count perceived the hesitation and turned the pages of RD 4336 till his finger pointed 
at Art 140 and he said: ‘Mon Roi, nous ne conduisons pas une guerre contre Dieu  … cette 
foi’.1  
The statutory provisions of RD 4336 were, by way of comparison to previous policies, 
idiosyncratic, and might have provided little relief to the Kingdom of Piedmont. In the 
decade that preceded RD 4336, the Piedmont Parliament sought to eliminate the system of 
                                                 
1
 [My Sire, we are not at war against God …  this time.]  
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mediaeval privileges granted to the Catholic Church. In particular, statute 978 of 29 th of 
April 1855, also known as the Anticlerical Laws, promoted by Camillo Benso, disbanded all 
Catholic religious orders in Piedmont and commanded the expropriation of all their assets 
that were not beneficial to the state (e.g. schools and hospitals). In 1873, and despite the 
small concession of having crosses hung in the schoolrooms, the policy of the 
expropriation of Catholic orders was extended to all the territories of the newly formed 
Italian state – including Rome – and those who tried to oppose the measures were arrested. 
High prelates, including bishops, who preached against the King and his First Minister, 
were put in prison all over Italy (Montanelli 2011). 
The reconstruction of the meeting is partly fictitious. However the historical events that 
surrounded it are, within the margin of error of any historical analysis, accurate (Montanelli 
2011). The point that I would like to make is that the statutory measures (ex RD 4336) that 
set the seed for the Lautsi case were firstly, hastily drafted by an individual (Camillo Benso), 
with distinctive anticlerical views, and secondly, adopted by a worried King in a period of 
war.  
In addition, and at pragmatic level, the decree made a very small concession to Italian 
Catholics. Firstly, the Kingdom of Piedmont could not afford to build new schools and 
would have had to depend on existing facilities. Two decades of war (including a costly 
expedition in the Crimea as an ally of France and Britain) sent the small state to the edge of 
bankruptcy. In most urban areas and de facto in all rural provinces, Sunday school classes 
‘doubled up’ as elementary schools. It is highly unlikely that the local priests (or those 
newly graduated from Catholic institutions) would have taken the time, each Monday, to 
take down the crucifix from the school wall and put it back up on Friday. Secondly, the 
great majority of elementary schools in the territories annexed after the 1859 Franco–
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Austrian War (e.g. Tuscany and the Milan Region) were managed by Jesuits and/or other 
religious orders. Thirdly, religious orders were also the governors of high schools and 
universities (spared by the 1855 Anticlerical Laws) that, at that time, trained the large bulk 
of the elementary and high school teachers. Given the admission process adopted by these 
educational institutions, it is logical to assume that most individuals were Catholics.  
In short, RD 4336 gave to foreign powers (e.g. France) the impression of a tolerant 
Christian constitutional monarchy, but it de facto registered the existence of the crucifix on 
primary school walls (rather than imposing it). The historical situation surrounding RD 
4336 also provides the necessary context to understand the Fascist decrees of the 1920s 
(RD 965 of 30th April 1924 and RD 1297 of 26th April 1928) directly reviewed in the Lautsi 
case. Fifty years after the unification of Italy, the pragmatic aspects that muddled the role 
of primary and Sunday schools were reduced. The anticlerical left, supported by Camillo 
Benso half a century before, had a significant impact on promoting a state-sponsored 
alphabetisation programme that included, among other things, a new school-building 
programme and the exclusion of religious teaching from the ministerial curriculum 
(Primary Education Guidance in RD 5724, 25th of September 1888). A policy of 
separation between state and church was also extended to the enforcement of common 
morality. Civil marriage was introduced in 1855, and in 1889, the Italian Parliament 
decriminalised homosexuality.  
Given the historical trajectory taken by the young Italian state, RD 965 of 30 th April 1924 
and the later decree RD 1297 of 26th April 1928 which extended the crucifix on the walls of 
middle and high schools, appear incongruous.  
However, the insertion of RD 965 might be explained by the attempt of a newly installed 
Fascist Party as a governing party in the Italian Parliament to reduce the political strength 
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of its opposition by forging an alliance with Catholic-inspired parties (Montanelli and Cervi 
1981). The opposition of the ‘soon-to-be’ dictatorship included the anticlerical left, which, 
in the early years of the Kingdom, promoted an open anticlericalism. In 1924, the 
perceived necessity of a larger political support for the Fascist regime among Catholics 
motivated Benito Mussolini and Giovanni Gentile (the Minister of Education) to have the 
King sign a decree that extended the practice of hanging the crucifix in middle and high 
schools. 
It is significant that until 1924, Mussolini had been an active exponent of the anticlerical 
movement (by writing, for instance, several pamphlets and editorials for the official 
socialist newspaper) and had worked, albeit quite briefly, as a primary school teacher. It is 
reasonable to speculate that both Mussolini and Gentile might have been witnessing some 
of the effects of the new secular school policies in forming the anticlerica l teachers. Gentile 
noted, for instance, that taking the crucifix down from school walls had become common 
practice (Panara 2011: 140). Again, the reason for the change of heart by Mussolini is a 
matter of speculation, but there is enough historical evidence to suggest that he was willing 
to reduce the process of state-sponsored aggressive secular indoctrination in exchange for 
support for his antidemocratic policies.  
To support the speculation that Mussolini’s ‘change of heart’ was motivated by 
pragmatism, there is an articulated literature and also the fact that the U-turn was hidden 
from the view of the Italian Parliament (Montanelli and Cervi 1981). Indeed, Art 118 of the 
1924 RD 965 (as well as Art 119 of RD 1297 of 26th April 1928), which imposed the 
display of the crucifix in middle and high school classes, was an administrative order 
(without parliamentary scrutiny) aimed at ‘reiterating’ the statutory measures of the RD 
4336 (1860).  
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After the collapse of the Fascist regime, the debate over the hanging of the crucifix 
continued in Italian institutions. For instance, in 1950, religious symbols were excluded 
from the places that were used for elections. It is noteworthy that ballot boxes were often 
located in schools, and that that created situations in which crucifixes were taken down and 
not rehung. There are also indications that the measure was not complied with by those to 
whom it was directed. For instance, it would appear to be impractical to expect that a 
hospital managed by a Catholic order would take the crucifixes down from its walls if its 
bedbound patients expressed their intention to vote. For a narrated insight into the election 
practices in Italy within a hospital managed by a religious order, please read Calvino’s 
Watcher (1975).  
The example of a Jesuit hospital might be extreme, but the contentions I make here are 
that firstly, in Italy, there is a robust debate over the role of the theist and secular, and 
secondly, that the Italian deliberative institution (the Parliament) has consistently perceived 
the debate as unsettled. The state-wide lack of a settlement over the issue does not (and did 
not) prevent a local accommodation of the debate that expressed teachers and parents 
views. 
II. Crucifixes: Symbols of divided societies or a manifestation of pluralism? 
In the previous section, I explained how Italy is a pluralistic democracy with strong belief-
based communities, which represent secular and religious groups. The existence of such 
pluralism is axiomatic and is historically inherited and recognised by the Catholic Church 
(Hasson 2003). In this section, I would like to argue that an open and on-going dialogue 
between theism and secular is beneficial for developing a richer understanding of the role 
of symbols in public spaces. In particular, I would argue that a policy of light intervention 
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by the state and by international jurisdictions might foster a democratic debate that 
dynamically adapts to set the scene for the increased demands of recognition.  
At the theoretical level, a polity could generate a sense of solidarity and alliance among its 
members by discussing their aspirations without any reference to identity, history or faith. 
Habermas’s theory of Constitution Patriotism is one of the latest attempts to set the basis 
for a post-national state and possibly a post-secular polity (1996). However, human rights 
principles are implemented by a process of dialectical refinement within a distinctive 
constituency. In the debate over state-recognised symbols in classrooms, there is 
reasonable evidence that such a process is on-going within Italian councils through their 
school governors and, more generally, in the whole Italian political arena.  
Recall, for instance, that with the post-1948 Constitution, which recognised the secular 
nature of the Italian state, parliaments had several opportunities to engage with the issue, 
but left it unchanged. The idea of administratively allowing the crucifix in the classroom 
might be perceived as a sign of institutional bias, even perhaps state indoctrination, but this 
fear is unproved.  
Crucifixes in Italian classrooms are part of an on-going debate, not an attempt to impose 
beliefs on others. All parents (Italian or not) can question the role of religious symbols (or 
the lack of them) in schools and it is the persistence of those symbols in some schools tha t 
is the most obvious evidence of the tension that a plurality of a system of beliefs generates 
in a diversified society. It is important in all democratic dialogues over concurring rights 
that a decision might have an impact (but, perhaps, it is more important in Italy, which 
historically has passed through the experience of the struggle for the recognition of a 
system of beliefs and has learned the hard way that such struggles do not admit a definitive 
solution). 
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However, developing a general criterion appears to be what is expected from the ECtHR, 
even in cases in which it might be unreasonable and undemocratic to assume that this 
would bring about a beneficial result. For instance, Ronchi points out the limited logical 
appeal of the idea of consensus as a criterion for a judicial decision (2011: 295). The 
rejection of the consensus as one of the supporting reasons is also found in Zucca:  
‘The Court goes on to say that the philosophical convictions of the parents 
must be respected by the State … Nevertheless, the Court manages to take 
away with one hand what it gives with the other in the very same paragraph, 
and in a feast of poor logic holds that this respect … depends on the  context 
and European consensus’ (2011).  
Indeed, the reference to consensus could be further articulated. However, the frustration 
with the legal reasoning given by the court is a manifestation (based on a combined reading 
of Art 2 of the First Protocol and Art 9) of the court acknowledging the limits of its 
jurisdiction.  
In particular, the case shows that Mrs Lautsi’s demand to the Council of School Governors 
is part of a struggle for the recognition of her beliefs in a democratic legal system: a legal 
system that recognises cultural diversity and that provides a variety of systems of 
accommodation for that diversity. This accommodation is not imposed, but is part of the 
democratic debate that has historically also been part of the theist–secular dialogue.  
It is axiomatic that such a contemporary dialogue must start from some legal basis (two 
RDs signed during the dark moments of the history of Italy). It is also unfortunate for Mrs 
Lautsi that her request did not convince the Council of School Governors of Abano 
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Terme; however, the refusal to have Mrs Lautsi’s children taught in a school without 
crucifixes is part of a larger on-going democratic process.  
Developing this point, in Lautsi v. Italy, the existence of a consensus is relevant because the 
interlocutors (e.g. the school governors, the Ministry of Education, the Association of 
Atheists) seek to form an intercultural understanding, which does not presuppose (or 
impose) a comprehensive solution.  
It is noteworthy that Lautsi v. Italy might not prevent the ECtHR from going back to the 
issue of crucifixes in school classes. For instance, if there were suspicions tha t state 
religious symbols were aprioristically imposed, it would be reasonable for the court to say 
that the issue set by concurring rights (ex Art 2) had not been democratically settled.  
However, in Lautsi, the court recognised that the debate over religious symbols in 
classrooms was part of a well-established dialogue between political stances. It is crucial 
that signatory states recognise parental desires (ex Art 2) and that the court might demand 
that state institutions to acknowledge the parental claims and respond to them. However, it 
cannot be expected to impose what is the specific accommodation of those demands. 
The ECtHR has the task of upholding the freedom of expressing religious beliefs, which 
the ECHR lists as one of the fundamental rights of modern democracy. However, the 
court cannot change the democratic process that accommodates concurring rights such as 
the right given to a parent to choose the type of education for their children ( ex Art 2 of 
the First Protocol). What the court could establish is whether each individual (and the 
political associations that represent him or her) has the democratic prerogative to initiate 
the process that might implement his/her rights and freedoms. In the absence of such a 
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process, the entitlement of a convention right such as the one given to parents to choose 
the type of education for their children would be hollow.  
The democratic importance of the procedures that decide concurring rights has been 
downplayed by commentators who have restricted their accounts of the court recognition 
of the role of the consensus merely to a debate between a majority and a minority. This 
creates the false assumption that – in cases where there is an on-going debate over the 
qualification of concurring rights – a jurisdiction can provide definitive solutions. This 
expectation is illogical. For instance, the ECtHR might decide that signatory state policies 
have denied the enjoyment of the right to property (ex Art 1 of the First Protocol), yet we 
cannot expect the court to decide how the property market is regulated. Similarly, the 
democratic process that decides on the accommodation of belief-based claims in public 
schools should be considered outside of the court’s jurisdiction.  
Conclusion 
Symbols are important. They are particularly significant in public educational 
establishments. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Lautsi v. Italy decided that signatory 
states have a margin of discretion when deciding on which symbols can be displayed (or 
indeed not displayed) in Italian public schools.  
In a relatively short motivation, the Grand Chamber acknowledged, perhaps for the first 
time, the conceptual separation between the task entrusted to the court (that is, the 
protection of the basic principles that allow for the functioning of a liberal democracy) and 
the practice of deliberating at the pragmatic level as to how concurring rights are 
accommodated.  
The court decision might lack the argumentative support expected in a seminal decision. 
The reference to a missing European consensus that justified the decision (combined with 
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an interpretation of Art 2 and Art 9) was perceived as an admission that human rights can 
be curtailed by the majoritarian principle. Such a position is unfounded. It stretches the 
reference to consensus to build arguments in which the court appears as a ‘puppet’ at the 
behest of public opinion and/or the Council of Europe.  
A more reasonable interpretation of the case would consider the multiple ECtHR 
references to the concept of consensus as an acknowledgement of a European-wide on-
going debate over the role of belief-based symbols in public schools. In the case of Lautsi, 
the right allocated to parents to decide on their children’s education in relation to their 
system of beliefs is unchallenged by Italy’s submission. However, at the pragmatic level, the 
right of Lautsi to select the education for her children has to be accommodated with the 
concurring demands of other parents.  
What is missing in the court’s decision is, perhaps, an articulation on how consensus 
should be formed. In the last section of the paper, I argue that a parent’s demand to change 
the display of belief-based symbols should be made at the school level. The debate should 
be open to all individuals and associations that might have an interest in the issue. The 
openness of the process will provide an indication as to how arguments are considered, and 
should reduce the effect of decisions based on pre-set alliances.  
In conclusion, Lautsi created a turning point in the ECtHR jurisprudence relating to the 
display of belief-based symbols in classrooms. The decision might, in some areas, lack 
articulation. This is, however, a minor aspect of the case. In Lautsi, the Grand Chamber 
moved away from the deductive process that assimilates secularism with state neutrality 
and acknowledged the practical implications of accommodating conflicts in highly 
diversified European societies.  
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